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TIGHTENING THE REINS OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF THE CRIMINAL JURY TRIAL IN ENGLAND AND THE 
UNITED STATES. By Michael H. Graham. Westport, Conn.: Green-
wood Press. 1983. Pp. xii, 341. $35. 
Commentators dismayed with the American criminal justice sys-
tem have often looked to the English system for guidance. 1 In Tight-
ening the Reins of Justice in America, Professor Michael H. Graham2 
uses this comparative technique to develop specific proposals for re-
form of the American criminal justice system. Graham follows a sin-
gle English case from arrest to conviction, exploring in detail the 
English criminal jury trial process.3 His reason for including the en-
tire trial transcript illustrates his admiration of the English system: 
"[T]he flavor of the trial, its civility, and its effectiveness in convict-
ing the guilty can best be appreciated by means of a transcript" (p. 
3). 
The English criminal justice system, as described by Graham, is 
"a well-oiled, cost-efficient, prosecution-oriented machine" (p. 228). 
As one illustration, Graham contrasts the dual standards for arrest 
and for charging a criminal defendant at a preliminary hearing in 
England with the single American standard. To arrest a suspected 
1. See, e.g., D. MEADOR, CRIMINAL APPEALS: ENGLISH PRACTICES AND AMERICAN RE-
FORMS (1973) (proposing, as the title suggests, reforms to the American criminal appeals pro-
cess gleaned from the English system). 
2. Michael H. Graham is a Professor of Law at the University of Illinois College of Law. 
Research leading to Tightening the Reins of Justice in America was conducted while Graham 
was at the University of Birmingham, Birmingham, England, as a Hays-Fulbright Research 
Fellow. Graham is also the author of HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE (1981); THE FED-
ERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL (1981). 
3. For a similar arrest through conviction description of the American criminal jury trial 
process, see J. POULOS, THE ANATOMY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1976). 
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criminal, English police must only show reasonable grounds to sus-
pect that the person has committed some crime (p. 13).4 American 
police, on the other hand, must have reasonable grounds to believe 
the person guilty (p. 14).5 According to Graham, the lower English 
standard of proof facilitates the apprehension of criminals.6 After 
arrest, however, the English police must demonstrate, at a prelimi-
nary hearing called a committal proceeding, that they have enough 
evidence admissible at trial to prove a prima facie case against the 
accused. Graham contrasts the English "prima facie evidence" stan-
dard with the same "reasonable grounds to believe" standard used 
by American courts for both arrest and the preliminary hearing. Ac-
cording to Graham, the higher English standard at the preliminary 
hearing ensures that only those defendants likely to be convicted go 
to trial, a cost-efficient element of the English system (p. 39). 
Graham traces the differing American and English criminal pro-
cedures to deeply held cultural attitudes about law and criminal jus-
tice. One American attitude is, according to Graham, that "as one 
develops [legal] analysis to the highest level of abstraction, each of 
the cases considered is more likely to be decided in a just fashion" 
(p. 243). But Graham argues that this complicated analysis produces 
instead the denial of justice.7 The great complexity of the criminal 
law leads to "an increased disregard for the law by the police fol-
lowed by confusion in ascertaining and applying the law on the part 
of counsel, court, and jury at trial" (p. 243). Graham advocates the 
adoption of simple, understandable legal rules, even if those rules 
may not produce the most analytically correct result in all situations: 
It is much better to have a rule of law that can be understood and 
applied uniformly in all cases, thus obtaining the correct result in the 
vast majority of cases, than to have a set of rules which, while analyti-
cally correct in all cases, cannot be readily applied in many cases, for 
whatever reason, by those called upon to administer them. [P. 244]. 
Graham attributes the lack of rigorous analysis of legal principles in 
4. For example, in the case Graham recounts, the defendant was arrested solely because he 
was an unemployed worker in possession of an unusually large amount of money. P. 13. 
5. Citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925) (describing the standard for 
arrest as information sufficient "to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that 
the offense has been committed," quoting Stacy v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878)). 
6. Although Graham admits that "[t]he practical result of the different standards applied 
in the two countries ... is difficult to assess on a general basis," p. 14, he concludes that an 
American court would not have found the information held by the English police in the case 
he recounts sufficient to support arrest of the defendant. P. 14. Bui see A. BLUMBERG, CRIMI• 
NAL JUSTICE 27 (1967) (suggesting that the American standard for arrest approaches the lower 
English standard described by Graham: "Although prosecution agencies are bound by arrest 
standards of probable cause in connection with felonies ... pressures of administrative effi• 
ciency too often resolve any doubts in favor of the organization."). 
7. For another critique of the current complex criminal procedure rules, see L. KATZ, Jus-
TICE IS THE CRIME 219 (1972) ("The procedural steps that have been piled upon the system so 
preoccupy the partcipants that the means dominate the ends which the means are to serve."). 
February 1984] Crime and Punishment 1133 
England to the English belief in their own capacity for fairness. 
That is, says Graham, the English fail to develop legal principles to 
ever greater levels of abstraction because they remain convinced that 
basic notions of justice can and will be applied fairly to the facts as 
they arise. 
An.other American attitude that Graham faults is the idea that 
committed advocacy on both sides will result in justice. The Ameri-
can attorney, says Graham, is so intent on winning that he "seeks to 
distort the truth by confusing and distracting the trier of fact in its 
search for the truth" (p. 250).8 Graham traces the zealous nature of 
the American process in part to the actors involved. Both the prose-
cutor's and the public defender's offices are staffed by young recruits, 
eager to chalk up a victory and win promotion. Says Graham: "The 
depth of antagonism between prosecuting attorneys and public de-
fenders should not be underestimated. Each motion, plea negotia-
tion, and trial is a single battle in a never-ending war" (p. 262). 
Graham also criticizes American discovery procedures, which place 
emphasis on tactics rather than truth-seeking; American witness con-
trol techniques, which make the courtroom a stage; and the ingratiat-
ing method of voir dire used by many criminal attorneys: "The time 
has long since past when society should pay the salary of two attor-
neys who take turns smiling at number seven juror in the second row 
while inquiring what magazines she reads or whether she is a vegeta-
rian" (p. 272). 
In contrast, says Graham, the English barrister displays a far 
more detached attitude than his American counterpart. Since the 
barrister is a trial lawyer only, an English solicitor prepares the case. 
Because the barrister for both prosecution . and defense reads the 
briefs and prepares for trial the night before it is to occur, he does 
not become as personally involved as an American attorney. This 
detachment is also physically evident in the courtroom. The English 
barrister does not stand by his client; rather, the barristers for de-
fense and prosecution stand together, identically clothed in wigs and 
robes. Graham notes that distinctive elements of the British legal 
profession, such as the fact that barristers represent both prosecution 
and defense in different cases, may account for the less aggressive 
attitude of the British barrister. Nevertheless, according to Graham, 
the detached stance of the defense counsel is also a natural incident 
of a system that emphasizes fact:finding · rather than emotional 
persuasion. 
Graham translates his critique of the United States criminal jus_-
8. Examples of this behavior, according to Graham, include interjecting irrelevant matters 
into the case to confuse the jury, raising objections to break the flow of damaging testimony, 
convincing the jury of the defendant's innocence by selling the attorney's relationship to the 
accused to the jury. P. 236; see generally D. COHEN, How TO WIN CRIMINAL CASES, BY ES-
TABLISHING A REAsoNABLE DOUBT (1970) (a handbook of American defense tactics). 
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tice system into concrete proposals (pp. 268-74).9 Not surprisingly, 
his proposals borrow heavily from the English version. The primary 
thrust of his reform is to bring the court into the criminal procedure 
early through the mechanism of an expanded preliminary hearing, 
comparable to the English committal proceeding. In this hearing, 
the prosecution would be required to present a prima facie case. The 
defendant would be encouraged to testify, subject to cross examina-
tion, in order to rebut the prima facie case. The defendant would 
have an incentive to appear as a witness because relevant inferences 
from failure to testify could be presented to the jury at trial. After 
the expanded preliminary hearing, the court would be familiar with 
the case and thus able confidently to check overly zealous counsel 
and to guide the jury in its factfinding mission. 
Graham recognizes that his proposals require substantial changes 
in existing law: "Only if reformers are willing to boldly alter existing 
procedures, and in the process make constitutional what is now un-
constitutional, and vice-versa, will meaningful reform be possible" 
(p. 269). He characterizes any potential attack on his specific pro-
posals as a "natural extension of reliance on overly complex legal 
analysis and, once again, a failure to see that the whole is both more 
and less than the sum of its parts" (p. 269). More important, accord-
ing to Graham, is that a new system be judged by whether the inte-
grated whole is efficient and fair, not by whether each aspect 
conforms to the current idea of procedural fairness. He proposes as 
a vehicle for change a Supreme Court advisory committee with 
broad discretion to revise criminal practice from arrest to appeal. 
Graham attempts to attack current American procedures by 
looking to the beliefs that generated them, and by pointing out what 
he believes to be the fallacy of their underlying premises. However, 
because the tenets he attacks are so deeply rooted in the American 
legal system, his proposals remain controversial. Although many of 
his assertions have intuitive appeal, Graham presents no statistical 
data to support his conclusion that reform according to his sugges-
tions would truly tighten the reins of justice. Furthermore, while 
Graham implicitly admits that some important values underlie the 
current American system of criminal justice, he does not explain 
how, or to what extent, they are to be preserved. 
First, the adversary system is so central to the American criminal 
justice process that it is rarely criticized 9r even discussed. 10 Al-
though he does not seek to abolish it, Graham does seek to circum-
9. One co=entator has compared the English and American systems without suggesting 
reforms for the American system. See D. KARLEN, ANGLO-AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
(1967); D. KARLEN, APPELLATE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND (1963). 
10. See A. STRICK, INJUSTICE FOR ALL 19-21 (1977) (noting lack of discussion of the 
American adversary system in prominent legal works). 
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scribe "adversary" behavior significantly. Unlike other 
commentators, he is not troubled by the potential injury to defen-
dant's rights resulting from limits on defense attorney behavior. 11 
Furthermore, Graham appears convinced that a more active court 
will promote justice. This premise, too, is far from being well-
established.12 
Second, complex legal analysis forms the basis of American legal 
procedure. The Supreme Court has consistently expanded the anal-
ysis of defendants' rights. This tendency casts doubts on the Court's 
willingness to move toward the more streamlined administrative 
model of justice envisioned by Graham. 13 Graham admits that the 
price of more functional criminal procedure rules "will be that in a 
particular given instance a decision might be contrary to that if com-
plex legal analysis were taken to the extreme" (p. 249). Still, he 
agrees that the level of abstraction chosen must "be high enough 
whatever the cost" to ensure that the accused receives a fair trial (p. 
249). This statement, however, is inherently ambiguous because 
Graham, by focusing on the system as a whole rather than its specific 
procedural guarantees, fundamentally changes the definition of "fair 
procedure."14 
In sum, Graham provides an interesting analysis of the differ-
ences between English and American criminal procedure. He 
thoughtfully points out the different assumptions that underlie the 
two systems and the consequent differences in procedure and out-
come. Whether one ultimately accepts Graham's proposals depends 
upon whether one agrees with his premise that more simple rules 
and more limited advocacy may produce greater justice. As the title 
suggests, Graham proposes to tighten the rei,ns of American justice. 
A move toward the English "prosecution-oriented machine" (p. 228) 
may be compatible with greater justice, but only if one believes that 
American criminal law now leans in the other direction. 
11. Cf. A. BLUMBERG, supra note 6, at 13-37 ( questioning whether "adversary" behavior in 
the American criminal justice system even exists). 
12. See K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 58 (1968) (quoting discussions with 
Hans Zeisel). 
13. See Packer, The Courts, the Police and the Rest of Us, in Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. 
ISRAEL, BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 188 (1980). 
14. See A. BLUMBERG, supra note 6, at 21 (arguing that the American criminal justice 
system even as it now exists with all its procedural guarantees does not offer a defendant a fair 
trial). 
